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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT IGNORES THE FEDERAL AND 
STATE POLICY AND LAW THAT APPLIES TO SCHOOL TRUST LANDS 
AND THE USE AND DISPOSITION OF SCHOOL TRUST ASSETS. 
Plaintiff's argument on the issues of estoppel and the 
meaning of the royalty clause in the lease ignores the recent 
decisions from surrounding states and the Supreme Court of the 
United States concerning school trust lands. If the requirements 
imposed by the United States Supreme Court and other state courts 
are applied to the facts and issues of this case, judgment should 
enter in favor of the State upholding the audit and requiring the 
Plaintiff to pay full value as it depletes school trust assets. 
If this Court rejects the law regarding school trust lands 
and follows Plaintiff's argument, there are issues of fact in 
dispute regarding both the application of estoppel, see 
Appellants' Brief at pages 34-37, and the Court should apply 
proper rules of construction to resolve the meaning of the lease 
provisions. See Appellants' Brief at pages 23-27. The case will 
need to be remanded to the trial court to resolve the alleged 
ambiguity in the lease provision and to determine whether there 
are facts to support the claim of estoppel, waiver or laches. 
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POINT II. TO ALLOW CLAIMS OF AMBIGUITY, VAGUENESS, 
ESTOPPEL, WAIVER, LACHES OR NEED FOR NOTICE, TO DEFEAT 
THE LEASE REQUIREMENT THAT ROYALTIES BE PAID AT THE 
PREVAILING FEDERAL RATE, WOULD UNLAWFULLY DEPLETE THE 
ASSETS OF THE SCHOOL TRUST FUND AND BE CONTRARY TO THE 
EXPRESS TERMS OF THE LEASE. 
Plaintiff has raised numerous technical arguments such as 
vagueness, waiver, laches or need for notice in its attempt to 
avoid paying the royalties provided by the lease. Pages 10, 27 of 
Respondent's Brief. The teachings of the courts are clear that 
to allow these kinds of claims to deplete the assets of the 
school trust should not be permitted. Particulary, when contrary 
to the express terms of the lease. In addition such defenses 
were not the basis of the trial court's decision and are not 
applicable on the facts of this case. 
The trial court did not rule on the question of waiver. 
Rather the trial court's decision was based on estoppel. Estoppel 
and waiver are distinct doctrines having different and separate 
elements. Hunter vs. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430 (Utah 1983). Plaintiff 
argues that a letter from John T. Blake to Blackhawk Coal 
Company, dated January 4, 1982, constitutes intentional 
relinquishment of the State's rights to the royalties. In making 
that argument Plaintiff misconstrues the background of that 
letter and omits the critical language in the letter. The 
background for that letter is that the State and Plaintiff were 
discussing adjustment or changing the written provisions of the 
coal lease which would result in an entirely new lease. Because 
Federal coal leases were being adjusted and litigation had 
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arisen, on issues of timing of adjustment notices, the State 
withheld forcing readjustment on the Plaintiff to await the 
Federal court decision on similar issues. The January 4, 1982 
letter passed that information on to the Plaintiff. The last 
paragraph of that letter clearly states: 
Further we expect to receive the same future royalty 
payments at the same rate prevailing for similar 
federal coal leases in the area. 
Plaintiff was clearly put on notice that it was to pay the rate 
prevailing on federal coal leases. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff 
ceased production and the lease was never adjusted. The State did 
not become aware that the Plaintiff had for sometime failed to 
pay the correct royalty until the audit was completed. 
The undisputed facts show that the State issued, to the 
Plaintiff, blank royalty reporting forms and relied on the 
Plaintiff to correctly report quantities of coal produced and pay 
the proper royalty for coal removed from State school trust 
lands. The Plaintiff did not report and pay the correct royalty. 
When the State set up an auditing division and audited its State 
coal leases it found, at that time, the failure of the Plaintiff 
to pay correct royalties. The State then took immediate action 
to demand payment of the royalties that were owed. There are no 
facts that show a voluntary, intentional relinquishment by the 
State of its right to collect the royalties that were owed for 
the coal removed from State trust lands. Furthermore, as 
discussed in Appellants' Brief, the doctrine regarding State 
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trust lands precludes the application of waiver against the State 
in this case. 
The defense of laches is not applicable against the State 
when it is used to defeat a public right or a public interest. 
Maricopa County vs. Cities and Towns Avonville, 467 P.2d 949 (Az. 
1970), Corvalis Sand and Gravel Company vs. State Land Board, 439 
P.2d 575 (Ore. 1968). The critical public interest in this case 
is the maximization of the income to the trust fund. Laches 
should not be allowed to defeat that purpose. Even if laches 
were applicable the Plaintiff would be required to show that the 
State had actual knowledge of its rights and that a substantial 
period of time, similar to the statute of limitations time 
period, had transpired from the time the State had knowledge of 
its rights to the time it exercised those rights. Albino vs. 
Albino, 568 P.2d 1344 (Ore. 1977), Board of County Commissioners 
vs. Echternacht, 572 P.2d 143 (Colo. 1977), Stevens vs. Equitable 
Savings and Loan Association, 522 P.2d 478 (Ore. 1974). In this 
case the undisputed facts show that the State was not aware of 
the underpayment of royalties, but rather relied on the Plaintiff 
to accurately report royalties. When the lease was audited and 
the State became aware of the underpayment, it immediately acted 
to collect those unpaid royalties. 
Plaintiff's claim that the breach of the lease occurred in 
the first quarter of 1979 and therefore, the State's entire claim 
is barred by Utah Code Ann. §78-12-23(2) was not addressed by the 
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trial court and is not supported by either the undisputed facts 
nor the law. The undisputed facts show that the State was not 
aware of any deficiency until it conducted its audit. When the 
audit was completed immediate demand was made upon the Plaintiff. 
The administrative proceeding which followed resulted in a 
finding that the Plaintiff owed royalties. The Plaintiff then 
filed this action for declaratory judgment. The undisputed facts 
further show that Plaintiff made royalty payments on a quarterly 
basis into mid-1983. At that time production ceased and royalty 
payments ceased. Under Utah Code Ann. §78-12-44 any statute of 
limitations would not have started to run until the royalty 
payments ceased in mid-1983. Even if the Court were to find that 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-23(2) was applicable and started to run at 
an earlier date, the statute would only run against each 
quarterly installment six years from the date it became due. It 
would not effect any quarterly royalty payments that were due 
during the six year time period prior to the time the 
counterclaim was filed. H.M. Case Corporation vs. Idaho Potato 
Processors, Inc. , 529 P.2d 1270 (Id. 1974) and When Statute of 
Limitations Begins to Run Against Action to Recover Upon Contract 
Payable in Installments 82 A.L.R. 316 (1933). 
Not only do these technical defenses raised by Plaintiff, in 
its attempt to avoid paying the royalties called for by the 
lease, fail for lack of factual and legal basis, but also because 
the overriding public interest factors do not allow State law 
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technicalities to be used when depletion of school trust assets 
are the result. 
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POINT III. ENFORCEMENT OF THE ROYALTY PROVISION OF THE 
STATE COAL LEASE ISSUED IN 1960 TO REQUIRE PAYMENTS AT 
THE PREVAILING FEDERAL RATE, DOES NOT CONSTITUTE 
RETROACTIVE RULE MAKING NOR PRECLUDE THE STATE FROM 
PRESERVING THE FUNDS OF THE SCHOOL TRUST FUND BY 
COLLECTING INTEREST ON DELINQUENT PAYMENTS. 
The Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, Utah Code Ann. §63-
48a-l et. seq. , is not applicable to this case. The State has 
not promulgated any new policy or new rule as defined in Utah 
Code Ann. §63-46a-2. The State is attempting to enforce the 
terms of a coal lease issued by the State in 1960. An audit and 
then the subsequent enforcement of the terms of the lease should 
not be considered rule making or policy making. Utah Code. Ann. 
§63-46a-2(8). 
The audit and demand for payment also include a demand for 
payment of interest on the unpaid royalties. To make the school 
trust whole, the trust is entitled to receive interest on the 
monies owed to the trust from the date of delinquency until paid. 
Otherwise, the trust would not receive the full value of its 
money. Plaintiff argues that the State can only collect interest 
after a final determination is made by the trial court. The case 
law of this State, however, provides that when a party is 
delinquent or underpays an obligation interest is owed from the 
date of the delinquency. Biork vs. April Industries, Inc., 560 
P.2d 317 (Utah 1977). 
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CONCLUSION 
The lease royalty provision should be enforced to maintain 
the trust relationship between the Federal Government and the 
people of the State of Utah. Technical claims or defenses raised 
here by Plaintiff to avoid paying the royalties required by the 
lease should be rejected as not factually nor legally supported 
and as thwarting the public interest and defaulting in the school 
trust responsibilities which the State owes to the Government of 
the United Sjktes and the people of the State. 
Respectfully submitted this3<^day of November, 1988. 
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